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A
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MASSACHUSETTS, AND LONDON, ENGLAND, 1985,

417 Pp., $25.00.
REVIEWED

By

DONALD

L.

BESCHLE*

No one involved in the legal community today can be unaware
of the disturbing signs of malaise that have appeared in recent
years. Surveys have shown that a large number of young attorneys
are dissatisfied with their work,' and law school faculty members
widely report their impressions of student dissatisfaction with the
very field which they are striving to enter.2 Although the articulated
reasons for this dissatisfaction among legal practitioners include
complaints that salaries for legal work are lower than expected, and
that such work is unchallenging and routinized,' my impression is
that there is also a lack of commitment to the value of the enterprise in which attorneys are engaged. Many lawyers have simply
failed to find satisfying answers to the basic questions of legal philosophy which would allow them to take pride in their work.
In an article that touched off a mild furor in the academic legal
community," Paul Carrington blamed the cynicism and nihilism present in law students today on the attacks made on the legal system
by the Critical Legal Studies movement, a group of scholars who
have attacked from a generally far left position many of the fundamental assumptions of American law.5 Published responses to Car* Assistant Professor, The John Marshall Law School. B.A., Fordham University; J.D., New York University School of Law; L.L.M., Temple University School of
Law.
1. See the discussion of the A.B.A. National Survey of Career Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction in Hirsch, Are You On Target?, BARRISTER 1, 17 (Winter 1985).
2. See, e.g., Weinstein, The Integrationof Intellect and Feeling in the Study of
Law, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 87 (1982) (discussing the difficulty students have in adjusting
to the professional role of the attorney).
3. See Hirsch, supra note 1, at 20-21.
4. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984).
5. See Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 563
(1983).
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rington6 have stressed, however, that cynicism and nihilism can be
found as readily in the mainstream of legal thought as in its radical
critics' thought. If scholars of the Critical Legal Studies movement
are the source of this nihilist infection, then how can one explain the
serious incidence of the disease in graduates of law schools where
the most "radical" thing any faculty member has done in recent
years has been to vote for Walter Mondale, and where most of the
faculty, if pressed, would identify Roberto Unger as a Neil Simon
character? 7 To the extent that the cynicism and nihilism of today's
law school graduates is the product of their law school experience, I
believe that it flows not from any radical theory that they may have
come across, but from their constant exposure to a simplified version of positivism, the dominant legal philosophy of the twentieth
century.
To the positivist, law consists of a set of rules adopted in conformance with some master rule of validation. In a dispute to which
one of these rules clearly applies, it is the duty of the court to follow
the rule. But since so many rules are unclear, at least at their edges,
and since there will be disputes to which no rule applies, courts
must often exercise discretion. In such cases, courts weigh arguments of social policy and choose the decision which best promotes
the overall welfare of the community. No matter what the court's
decision is, it becomes, by virtue of having been made, the "right
answer" to the problem. Prior to the decision no one "right answer"
existed; two or more possible "right answers" existed as legitimate
alternatives. Legal decisions that result from such an exercise of
court discretion, therefore, cannot be wrong. Such decisions may follow foolish policy choices, but because the judge had no duty to act
on standards other than policy preferences, his decision cannot be
wrong in any absolute sense.
This may be an oversimplification of positivism as set forth by
its most significant twentieth century exponents.8 Nevertheless, it is
clear that this is the form of positivism that currently constitutes
the "ordinary religion" of the law school classroom and the legal system as a whole. It is also the doctrine that Ronald Dworkin, Professor of Law at New York University and University Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford University, has consistently attacked for two
decades.
6. See the correspondence collected in Martin, "Of Law and the River," and of
Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985). Robert Gordon, in a
letter to Carrington, insists that such people as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Thurman
Arnold and Grant Gilmore can more plausibly be labelled "nihilists" than "a romantic Christian Hegelian like Roberto Unger." Id. at 14-16.
7. Unger is the particular target of Carrington's attack. See supra, notes 4-6.
8. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF
A LEGAL SYSTEM (1970).
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In his new book, A Matter of Principle, Dworkin develops, refines, and elaborates the themes that he set forth in his 1978 book,
Taking Rights Seriously.' His present offering, like that earlier
work, is a collection of previously written essays grouped together by
subject matter. Taking Rights Seriously was hailed as one of the
most important books on the philosophy of law in recent decades. In
this new book, Dworkin responds to criticism that was leveled at the
thoughts expressed in his previous volume. While doing so he develops his thought and clarifies his philosophy. It is, therefore, unlikely
that A Matter of Principle will be considered as important as Taking Rights Seriously, simply because that prior work first made
Dworkin's philosophy available to a wide audience. Still, A Matter
of Principle is itself a significant, provocative, and interesting book.
The first group of essays in A Matter of Principle generally deal
with Dworkin's contention that the law consists not only of rules,
but also principles. These principles, which have not always been
enacted or explicitly validated through some master rule, are more
general statements of the ideals underlying the legal system as a
whole. To Dworkin, both rules and principles are sources of legal
rights. Nevertheless, principles are to be distinguished from rules
and from policies.
Policies seek to implement goals, particularly the overriding
goal of increasing the general welfare of the community. Principles
according to Dworkin, however, are not concerned with welfare maximization, but rather are concerned with the vindication of rights.
Policies are the stuff of legislative decisions; the democratic process
is the appropriate forum for weighing competing policies. But in
Dworkin's view, judges must act according to principle, not policy,
because where principle dictates an outcome, arguments of general
welfare must be ineffective. Only competing principles are proper
matters for judicial consideration.
With these first essays as background, Dworkin's next set of essays addresses the proper judicial approach to deciding cases. Dworkin agrees with the positivists that when the rules are clear they
control, and that in such cases the litigants have the right to a decision consistent with those rules. To this extent, Dworkin, who has
been described by some as a modern-day natural law theorist,
clearly breaks with the classical natural law position, which holds
that a specific rule has no force and creates no rights if inconsistent
with the overriding system of natural law.10
9. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
10. John Mackie describes Dworkin's thought as neither positivism nor a theory
of natural law. Mackie, The Third Theory of Law, R. DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY
JURISPRUDENCE (Cohen ed. 1984).
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In cases where no rule clearly controls, Dworkin breaks with
positivism and insists that there is a single, correct answer. The answer can be found through a consideration of the principle or principles applicable to the case. Dworkin readily concedes, however, that
the right answer will often be a matter of sharp dispute, and that
neither side will be able to deliver an irrefutable "knockout punch"
of an argument for its position. Still, contends Dworkin, this does
not mean that one side is not right and the other wrong. He maintains that some arguments are better than others in an objectively
demonstrable way, and that judges are duty bound to rule in favor
of the side providing the strongest argument based upon principle.
A judge, according to Dworkin, may not use a decision merely to
advance his or her preferred policies as if he or she were a legislator.
In one of the most interesting essays in the book, entitled "How
Law Is Like Literature," Dworkin analogizes a judge to a literary
critic. He points out that literary criticism constantly asks questions
that are not directly answered by the text. As an example, Dworkin
uses the question of whether Hamlet and Ophelia were lovers before
the play begins. The fact that scholars take such questions seriously,
and that there are answers to such questions that are more in keeping with the overall nature of the work than contrary answers would
be, demonstrates the way in which scholars pursue truth even in the
face of some inevitable degree of uncertainty.
When a literary scholar finds no definite answer to a relevant
question in the text, he does not have discretion to answer the question as he chooses. He must provide an answer that is sufficiently
consistent with the underlying themes of the work so that his answer will be superior to alternative answers. If he does not, his answer will be correctly labelled "wrong." Likewise, Dworkin believes
that in the absence of clear rules, judges may not rely on their favorite policies, but must turn to principles present in the legal system
as a whole. An answer inconsistent with these principles can be correctly labelled as wrong.
What is the difference between taking the positivist position
that there is no right answer in hard cases, and taking Dworkin's
position that there always or almost always is a right answer even
though the correctness of the right answer cannot always be made
absolutely clear? In attempting to answer this question, Dworkin
points to the fact that attorneys invariably frame their arguments as
assertions that their clients have the right to a favorable decision,
rather than arguing that the judge should merely exercise his or her
discretion in favor of their clients. Dworkin's position gives legitimacy to those arguments. It places a stronger duty on judges to decide cases and explain their decisions in light of an intellectually
honest and rigorous analysis of discoverable standards. It does not
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allow judges to assume that their own preferences may properly
come into play. Moreover, Dworkin's position allows us to criticize
judicial decisions in hard cases not merely upon the grounds that
they are unwise as a matter of policy, but also upon the grounds
that they are wrong.
If the simplified, popular form of positivism is valid, then what
we as lawyers do is far less important than we would want to imagine. For if all legal decisions are either mechanical adherence to
clear rules or discretionary choices among competing policies, the
lawyer is largely irrelevant to the decision making process. A competent layperson could quickly learn to research the law in order to
discover the clear rules, and he or she could also articulate why a
decision in his or her favor would be a generally beneficial thing.
Under positivism, therefore, all of the lawyer's arguments about
rights and entitlements in hard cases become mere window dressing
that is simply used to mask what is really going on, a judge doing
what he or she wants to do. It is little wonder that lawyers and law
students who are forced to articulate the language of rights, correct
and incorrect decisions, and closely reasoned arguments, while believing that the whole enterprise turns merely on the personal preferences of the decision maker, would become cynical and dissatisfied
with their work. The chief virtue to Dworkin's view of the decision
making process may be that it allows all of us involved in the process, as participants or critics, to believe in the value and legitimacy
of What we are doing. 1
So, under Dworkin's philosophy, hard cases have right answers
and those answers are to be found in principles, not policies. If the
reader stays with Dworkin this far, the next question demanding an
answer is how do we distinguish principles from policies? If we cannot or if the distinction is purely semantic and a judge's favorite
policy may simply be recast in different words as a principle, Dworkin's argument may have done nothing worthwhile. And far worse,
his argument may have provided judges with a more potent weapon
with which to impose their policy choices.
Dworkin is very clear about what does not constitute an argument of principle. In making this point, he takes on some of the
more popular current theories of legal analysis. Dworkin maintains
that arguments of general welfare, whether those of classical utilitarianism or the wealth maximization theories of Posner 2 and the
11. This is not to say that the popular view of positivism does not provide its
own psychological benefits. The most prominent, it seems to me, is that it allows
lawyers to avoid having to conclude that the positions which they must advocate are
"wrong," since hard cases do not have "right" and "wrong" answers, merely plausible
alternatives for the exercise of judicial discretion.
12. See R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
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"Law and Economics" school of thought, are policy arguments and
therefore not appropriate standards for judges to invoke. Dworkin
devotes two essays to a broad attack on the concept of wealth maximization as the basic principle underlying judicial decision making.
Dworkin also attacks the view that the "intent" of the framers
should control in matters of statutory and constitutional construction.1 3 In the essay entitled "The Forum of Principle" he explains
why he believes that focusing on the legislators' state of mind at the
time that the provision in question was enacted is misguided and
futile. Most important is his discussion of the difference between
abstract and concrete intentions, which coexist in a legislator's
mind, but which may well conflict in the analysis of a particular
problem.
Dworkin also rejects, as a principle of constitutional analysis,
the position of John Hart Ely and others, which holds that the ultimate purpose of the constitution is to maintain properly functioning
democratic processes rather than to dictate the specific content of
the decisions reached by those processes. 4 Dworkin's criticism is
largely based upon the fact that "democracy" is defined in different
ways in different cultures, and that the choice of a definition is not
itself a choice involving process, but involves a choice of substance
instead. This is no doubt correct, but I think his criticism of Ely is
far less successful than his critique of Posner and the advocates of
''original intention." Ely's concept of democracy is not far removed
from the adherence to principle urged by Dworkin. Ely seems to be
committed to the concept that government should treat all citizens
equally and with dignity and respect. Although the semantics may
differ (Ely sees this as a matter of "process," Dworkin calls it "substance"), I believe the real problem is that working from substantially similar assumptions, they still differ about specific controversial cases, such as Roe v. Wade.15
Dworkin, then, rejects utilitarianism, wealth maximization, the
intent of the constitutional framers, and commitment to process as
central foundations in the search for principle. Instead, he turns to
what he conceives of as the central principle from which all the rest
seem to flow. To Dworkin, that principle is one of equality. Specifically, he believes that all citizens are entitled to governmental treatment which extends them equal dignity and respect. This leads to
the third set of essays in the book, which contain Dworkin's definition and defense of liberalism.
13. Probably the most prominent advocate of this position is Raoul Berger. See
R.

BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1977).
14.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

See J.

15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

A

(1980).
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The core principle of equality leads to the related principle that
government may not legitimately act to declare a chosen way of life
as less worthy than another. As Dworkin puts it, "government must
be neutral on what might be called the question of the good life." 6
But this is not skepticism; it does not mean that liberals have no
position on right and wrong. Liberals, rather, believe that fundamental equality is right. Liberalism, however, is not libertarianism.
It is permissible to restrict liberty in furtherance of the fundamental
right of equal treatment. On the surface, this is paradoxical because
liberalism must be illiberal about those who would deny its basic
premises. It may, however, be the only way to avoid having the prin17
ciple destroy itself.
Ultimately, Dworkin's commitment to neutrality and equality
must allow one fundamental exception. There is no neutrality with
respect to the principle of neutrality, and there is no equality for the
principle of inequality. On one level this is logically troubling. Dworkin can be charged with self-interest. In his liberal state, the most
effective members of the political and legal community will be those
who can skillfully reason from principles to policies and rules, that
is, people like Ronald Dworkin. This alone, however, is no reason to
reject his arguments.
Certainly, self-interest also taints illiberal theorists. In their
ideal polity, they would be the happiest of citizens. Still, it remains
true that the belief in neutrality and equality most ultimately rest,
just as must all its competitors, on an ultimate concept of the good
society and the good life. Moreover, this concept must itself rest not
on an argument but on conviction, despite the fact that it cannot be
clearly demonstrated.
Finally, Dworkin applies his theories to specific issues. In his
discussion of the Bakke decision"8 he concludes that "reverse discrimination" is not a violation of the principle of equality because it
cannot be taken to imply an attitude on the part of government that
its "victims" are somehow less worthy individuals than its beneficiaries. On the question of obscenity, he concludes that there is a
right to the private consumption of pornography although not to its
public display. This conclusion is grounded in his contention that
however misguided, a belief that such consumption promotes the
16. R. DWORKIN, A
17.

MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

191 (1985).

This same position is espoused by Bruce Ackerman in his important work
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980). To Ackerman, the struggle for power
must, in the liberal state, be carried on by rational argument, but certain fundamentally illiberal arguments are labelled as illegitimate. One may not support an argument by resorting to the position that he or she is "intrinsically superior to one or
more of his fellow citizens." Id. at 11.
18. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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good life must be respected, at least in the absence of a demonstrated link to violations of another's rights.
In the "fair trial-free press" debate, Dworkin ultimately supports the criminal defendant. Although the press certainly does have
rights, the so-called "right to know" of the public at large is not
founded on principle, but rather is a matter of policy. Even though
this policy may outweigh many conflicting policies, when it collides
with a matter of principle, such as the right to a fair trial, it must
yield.
In one of the more interesting essays in the book, Dworkin attempts to delineate the conditions under which civil disobedience is
proper in a democratic society, and under what circumstances government should respond with punishment. Although this essay was
originally a speech addressed specifically to the West German antinuclear movement, its relevance to issues such as the sanctuary
movement and recent anti-apartheid activity makes it timely and
useful beyond its original context.
In short, A Matter of Principle is a useful and important contribution to the literature of jurisprudence. Dworkin does not prove
all of his points or leave positivism broken and vanquished, but how
could he? As his own theory concedes, even right answers in hard
cases will continue to be matters of sharp dispute, and the issues
discussed in this book are among the "hardest cases" of all.
Ultimately, what is most important in the field of jurisprudence
is that the dialogue continue. Dworkin's earlier work, Taking Rights
Seriously, responded to H.L.A. Hart. Critics in turn responded to
that work. A Matter of Principle takes the dialogue a step further.
For that reason, even if Dworkin is wrong, his work is important;
even if the reader disagrees with it, the book will prove valuable. At
the very least, Dworkin has forced positivists to refine and more
clearly articulate their own views.
Critics have claimed that the positivism Dworkin attacks is a
straw man, an oversimplified caricature of a more subtle theory that
does place restraints upon judges and does, therefore, make the
work of the advocate meaningful.19 Still, it is this simplified version
that many lawyers believe in, and it is this version that is consciously and unconsciously transmitted to many law students. If
Dworkin does nothing more than force positivists to be better positivists and take pains to communicate why their theories do not lead
to a legal system where the only options in decision making are
mechanical adherence to rules or unbounded discretion, then what
19. See generally RONALD DWORKIN
ed. 1984) (several of the essays).

AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE

(Cohen

19851

A Matter of Principle

he has done is of great importance.
This is not to say that the work is valuable only for its ability to
provoke response. Much of what Dworkin sets forth is useful and
largely correct. This is especially true of the principle-policy distinction, and the assertion that there is a correct answer in hard cases.
Where Dworkin runs into trouble is in his attempt to universalize
his system of thought to cover all areas of law. It is instructive that
his specific examples are so often drawn from areas such as constitutional and criminal law. The overriding importance of principle and
the lesser regard for policies of welfare or wealth maximization in
the jurisprudence of these areas is evident. But elsewhere in the law,
such as in common tort law litigation or litigation under the antitrust statutes, it seems obvious not only that courts are heavily involved in weighing policies, but also that such activity is far less objectionable than it would be in other contexts.
When Posner and others attempt to extend the useful concept
of wealth maximization too far they become easy targets for Dworkin. Similarly, however, Dworkin's thought loses some of its persuasive power when it is put forward as always being the proper way for
a court to proceed. Principle may be more important than policy,
and there may be areas of law where principle is the only proper
consideration, but I doubt that policy can be entirely eliminated as a
proper judicial concern.
A few words should be said on the style of the book. One of
Dworkin's advantages is the fact that although he is dealing with
very difficult concepts and questions, his work is accessible. The
pieces vary in both length and depth, as would be expected of a
collection of articles originally written for such diverse places as the
New York University Law Review and the New York Review of
Books. Nevertheless, a reader with a genuine interest in the subject
matter and some general background knowledge of how courts work
will be able to follow the arguments. On the other hand, since these
essays are part of an ongoing debate between Dworkin and his critics, those who have read Taking Rights Seriously and the works of
Hart and others will have less of a sense of having walked in during
the middle of the show.
As is inevitable in any collection of previously published essays,
there is some overlap, but it is minimal and at times the repetition
of key ideas in different contexts is helpful. Another minor problem,
also inevitable given the nature of the book, is the fact that some of
the essays are direct responses to other theories or articles with
which the reader may not be familiar. To be sure, Dworkin summarizes the views of his adversaries, but at times one gets the impression of an experience not unlike watching a televised debate and
turning down the sound every time a disfavored candidate begins to
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speak. Ultimately, this is less a criticism of Dworkin's book, however, than an admonition to the reader seriously concerned with the
issues discussed to seek out and read these competing views in full.
Whether one practices, teaches, or enforces the law, all members of the legal community spend time consciously or unconsciously
thinking about basic questions or jurisprudence. The first step in
overcoming a sense of malaise of cynicism about legal work is to understand what that work actually is and should be. For those who
are interested in pursuing these descriptive and normative questions
of legal philosophy, it is fortunate that Dworkin's thought is conveniently available in print. A Matter of Principle is a valuable book.
It is interesting, provocative, and well worth the time of anyone who
cares about law and legal institutions.

